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INTRODUCTION
The aim of this paper is to examine the comparative strengths and
weaknesses of two approaches to mitigating the offense given, and
harm threatened, by prenatal testing for impairments:1 limiting such
testing to the most severe diseases and impairments, or imposing no
medical limits at all. Although I favor the latter approach, I will argue that the alternatives present a choice between distinct evils.
To set the stage for this discussion, it is necessary to challenge the
conventional picture of prenatal testing, its purposes, and its dangers. On this conventional view, prenatal testing serves the legitimate medical function of preventing severe diseases in future children, as well as the associated health threats to the parents and
families of those children.2 Because of the small number of conditions
that are currently detectable, such testing is largely used for the appropriate purpose of preventing such severe conditions as cystic fibrosis (CF), spina bifida, Duchenne’s Muscular Dystrophy (DMD), as
well as Down syndrome and several other trisomies. There is one
glaring exception: sex-selection, which is devoid of medical justifica* Research Scholar, Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy, University of Maryland; B.A., Yale University, 1975; J.D., University of Michigan, 1978; M.A. (Psychology),
University of North Carolina, 1984.
1. I will refer to prenatal testing for “impairments,” rather than “disabilities,” to reflect the now-conventional understanding of impairment as physical or mental abnormality, and disability as an interaction between such limitations and an individual’s environment. Clearly, a disability so understood is not the kind of condition that can be tested for
prenatally, or genetically.
2. See, e.g., COMM. ON ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, DIV. OF HEALTH SCIS. POLICY,
INST. OF MED., ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS: IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY
(Lori B. Andrews et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS]; PRESIDENT’S
COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. & BIOMED. RESEARCH, SCREENING
AND COUNSELING FOR GENETIC CONDITIONS (1983) [hereinafter SCREENING AND
COUNSELING]; Wolfram Henn, Consumerism in Prenatal Diagnosis: A Challenge for Ethical Guidelines, 26 J. MED. ETHICS 444 (2000).
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tion except for sex-linked diseases. Fortunately, however, there is little demand for prenatal sex selection in the United States, even for
the relatively benign purpose of family balance; such testing is
discouraged or condemned by professional organizations and, in some
places, by law.3
But, according to this conventional view, a serious threat is just
over the biotechnological horizon. “[T]he age of positive eugenics is
almost upon us.”4 It will soon be possible to do prenatal genetic testing for minor disorders, and for minor risks of severe disorders; in
the not so distant future, genetic tests will be available for positive
traits as well, like intelligence. The medical community, particularly
the obstetric establishment, views this prospect, with sanctimonious
horror:
It may be too early to warn that we are at the edge of a slippery
slope towards a new dimension of eugenics, but we must realise
that new tools to fulfill the tempting wish to have not only healthy,
but gifted children will soon be in our hands.5

This is not a wish, however tempting, that doctors should help their
patients to fulfill, because terminating a pregnancy of a baby expected to be healthy is “counterintutive to the Hippocratic ideas of
health care.”6 To avoid this kind of professional abuse, “there is an
urgent need to extend the current ban on prenatal paternity and
gender testing to any parameter of prenatal genetic diagnosis that is
not immediately related to severe disease in the prospective child.”7
A clue that there is something very wrong in this picture should
come from the restriction to “severe disease.” It would be considered
not only unnecessary but unethical and perverse for doctors to refuse
to provide preventative or therapeutic services to their patients, or
the public, for minor diseases (except in cases of extreme scarcity).
Indeed, much of our current health care budget, and our public funding for research, prevention, and treatment, is directed towards arguably minor, or at least non-severe diseases. If prenatal testing
serves the legitimate medical function of preventing diseases, why
should it be wrong (if less urgent) to extend it to minor diseases? This
restriction should make us question whether prenatal testing can be
seen as a medical function at all, in the widely-accepted sense of a
function serving to protect or restore the health of individual pa3. ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, supra note 2, at 8, 85-86; Ethics Comm. of the Am.
Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Preconception Gender Selection for Non-Medical Reasons, 75
FERTILITY & STERILITY 861 (2001); J. McMillan, Sex Selection in the United Kingdom,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb. 2002, at 28.
4. Henn, supra note 2, at 445.
5. Id. at 446.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 445.
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tients. If it is not, however, we are not at the edge of a slippery slope,
but already in an ethical limbo, facing unresolved questions about
the basic legitimacy of a non-medical practice carried out by doctors
and other health professionals.
I. DEMEDICALIZING PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS
Prenatal diagnosis—whether through amniocentesis, chorionic
villuis sampling, or preimplantation genetic diagnosis; whether for
Down, CF, female gender, or blue eyes—needs to be seen for what it
is, or more importantly, what it is not. It is not a medical procedure—
a procedure intended to protect or restore an individual’s health—
unless it is undertaken to protect the mother’s health, or the health
of the fetus or infant, through early intervention. It is, typically, a
procedure to identify and destroy unwanted organisms. But to say
that it is not a medical procedure is not to say that it is wrong, or
even wrong for a doctor to perform. A pregnancy test for an unmarried adolescent, undertaken to procure an abortion at the earliest
possible date (if the test is positive), is not a medical procedure either, unless it is intended to protect the health of the adolescent,
which it rarely is (except in the expansive World Health Organization (WHO) sense of “health” in which avoiding the social burden of
adolescent child-rearing is a matter of health). It is quite possible to
regard abortion as justifiable, and to regard doctors as the appropriate agents to carry it out, while denying that it serves to protect or
restore the health of individual patients. One can take a similar view
of physician-assisted suicide—the fact that suicide is not healthprotecting or restoring does not mean that doctors should not assist
it.
What this does suggest, however, is that mainstream opponents of
prenatal sex-selection cannot reject it on the grounds that it is not a
bona-fide medical service. When groups such as the Institute of
Medicine piously condemn genetic testing and abortion for sexselection on the grounds that it is “a misuse of genetic services,”8 they
need to explain why abortion for child- or disability-prevention is any
less of an abuse, since neither typically serves to promote or protect
the health of any individual human being. If doctors can legitimately
perform non-healing functions in aborting the unwanted fetus carried by an adolescent girl, or in honoring the express desire of an elderly patient to avoid a lingering death, then why would they not perform a legitimate function by letting parents have the kind of children they want—male, brown-eyed, or unimpaired? The reason cannot be simply that facilitating such parental choice is not a medical

8. ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, supra note 2, at 105.
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function.
The standard critique of sex selection conflates two distinctions:
between pathological and normal human variations (or disease and
non-disease states), and between medical and non-medical functions.
Unlike many disability scholars and bioethicists, I believe there can
be a plausible biological basis for the former distinction, between
pathological and normal states; that the distinction need not reflect
social, cultural, or moral values.9 But while this first distinction is
needed to explain the second, which concerns the protection or restoration of health, the two distinctions are not identical. A doctor who
prevents the existence of someone who will have certain pathological
states—diseases or impairments—is not performing a medical function (although he may be performing a public-health function). The
doctor who selects among in vitro embryos to find a compatible marrow-donor for an ailing child is performing a medical function for
that child, but not for those embryos. If the rationale for the doctor’s
services to enhance the couple’s freedom of choice or to save an ailing
child (when no else else’s rights are violated), why should it matter if
the conditions they “prevent,” unlike female sex or brown eyes, are
abnormal, pathological, or inherently undesirable? There need not be
anything wrong in a doctor’s performing a non-medical function; the
job descriptions of professionals often change, and sometimes for the
better.10
II. TWO EVILS
The more credible concern about the expansion of prenatal testing
is that doctors who assist their patients in aborting fetuses or discarding embryos, on the basis of sex or marrow-incompatibility, are
doing something wrong, not because it is non-medical, but because it
abets the degradation of the parental role and the commodification of
children. The concern is that once parents who intend to have children can set conditions on the kind of children they will have, they
slough off the commitment to loving and rearing whatever child they
have and start down the slope towards designer babies; toward the
corruption of child-making by a consumer mentality.11 This concern,
however, grounds an objection to prenatal testing for disease and
disability, as well as for sex and marrow-compatibility.
I do not want to dismiss this concern, because I think that the
threat is real, if exaggerated. Moreover, I agree that autonomy has
9. See generally Robert Wachbroit, Health and Disease, Concepts of, in 2 ENCYCLOPE533 (1998).
10. See, e.g., John D. Arras, Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Tragic View, 13 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 361 (1997).
11. See, e.g., SCREENING AND COUNSELING, supra note 2, at 57-58.
DIA OF APPLIED ETHICS
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enjoyed an unwarranted ascendancy as the “master value” in bioethics, and that its promotion must often yield to other concerns.12
But I will argue that the threat of insufficient commitment and
commodification is not the only one raised by prenatal testing for
disability, and that it may be the lesser of two evils. If such testing
can be seen as the first step towards a noxious and destructive
finickyness in the creation of children and families, it can also be
seen as something very different and less novel. The phenomenology
of selecting against disability and selecting for desired traits may be
quite different, even if certain moral theories, such as standard actutilitarianism, treat them as similar.13 Eliminating disabled fetuses
or embryos may be seen as applying modern technology to the ancient imperative of discarding defective children, rather than to the
(alleged) contemporary desire for “a perfect baby.”14
The classical Greeks who left defective children on mountainsides
were not nascent perfectionists; they were more likely to have been
frightened, superstitious parents anxious to rid themselves of children with the marks of divine disapproval. Like modern parents who
will not abort after the second trimester, ancient parents got rid of
defective children with some scruples and constraints—they would
not kill the children directly, but only facilitate their death from
natural causes such as exposure.15 Beyond avoiding stigma and divine displeasure, their aspirations for their children may have been
exceedingly modest.
The most effective way of counteracting the contemporary expression of those enduring fears and superstitions in the demand for prenatal disability testing may be to refuse to dignify such testing as a
medical function; to treat it instead as a consumer service. The likelihood of serious impairment would be neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for that service. Permitting or requiring doctors to offer prospective parents the widest available menu of prenatal tests,
including but not limited to tests for various impairments, might
help to de-stigmatize disability. But such reproductive freedom
would not be a “positive good,” or an unmixed blessing. A regime of
unfettered parental choice would take the focus off disability only by
further corrupting the process of child-making, encouraging a finicky
12. See, e.g., Susan Sherwin, Feminism and Bioethics, in FEMINISM & BIOETHICS: BE47, 52-53 (Susan M. Wolf ed., 1996).
13. See, e.g., Julian Savulescu, Procreative Beneficence: Why We Should Select the Best
Children, 15 BIOETHICS 413 (2001).
14. See GLENN MCGEE, THE PERFECT BABY (2000).
15. For the classical Greek practice of exposing unwanted or defective children, see
SOPHOCLES, OEDIPUS REX (Roger D. Dawe ed., 1982). For a discussion of the classical
Greek attitudes towards causation action and responsibility, see ARTHUR W.H. ADKINS,
MERIT AND RESPONSIBILITY: A STUDY IN GREEK VALUES (1975).

YOND REPRODUCTION
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consumer mentality or a vulgar perfectionism on the part of prospective parents. Some would argue that this would be too high a price to
pay for alleviating the stigma of disability; others would argue that it
would fail, or backfire, increasing intolerance for disability.
III. TWO APPROACHES
There are two approaches to regulating prenatal testing that appear to parallel the two concerns about commodification and stigma.
One approach would limit testing/responsibility/liability to a small
subset of severe or widespread disabilities; the other would expand
testing/responsibility/liability beyond disability to a full range of conditions that parents might seek to avoid, with the “burden of disability” merely one factor in the assessment of duties and damages.
Dorothy Wertz and Jeff Botkin have offered very different versions of
the former approach;16 I favor the latter approach and will defend it
here, not as a means of promoting parental autonomy, which I regard
as a suspect or overrated goal, but as a way of mitigating the harm
and muting the expressive significance of prenatal testing for people
with disabilities.
I will argue that these approaches should be seen as responsive to
the two distinct concerns about prenatal testing I have sketched
above: the growing sway of a consumer mentality toward procreation,
and the continuing stigmatization of disabilities. Although both
threats involve a degradation of the parental role, resistance to them
may pull us in opposite directions. Disabilities may be less stigmatized in a reproductive regime in which neither they, nor any subset
of them, have a special role in legitimizing abortion; consumerism
may have less sway in a regime that permits testing only for the
most severe disabilities. But the former takes the onus off disability
by promoting a broader consumer mentality, while the latter discourages such a mentality by keeping the onus squarely on disability.
Since it is neither feasible nor morally acceptable to prohibit all prenatal testing, we will be faced with a choice of evils.
To make the distinction between these two purposes is not to deny
that some people with specific impairments, or their advocates, favor
a narrowing approach that excludes their impairment, or even to
deny that the dominant motivation for a narrowing approach may be
to avoid the stigmatization of as many impairments as possible. But
there is considerable force to the argument made by critics of line16. Dorothy C. Wertz, Drawing Lines: Notes for Policymakers, in PRENATAL TESTING
DISABILITY RIGHTS 261 (Erik Parens & Adrienne Asch eds., 2000); Jeffrey R. Botkin,
Fetal Privacy and Confidentiality, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept.-Oct. 1995, at 32 [hereinafter Botkin, Fetal Privacy]; Jeffrey R. Botkin, Line Drawing: Developing Professional
Standards for Prenatal Diagnostic Services, in PRENATAL TESTING AND DISABILITY RIGHTS,
supra, at 288 [hereinafter Botkin, Line Drawing].
AND
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drawing that, if this is its purpose, it is self-defeating; that the focus
and debate on the placement of the line will only serve to re-affirm
the legitimacy of impairment in general as a basis for abortion.17
Those impairments placed on the near side of the line may enjoy little or no reduction in stigma, since their exclusion as grounds for
abortion may be perceived as the result of balancing or compromise,
not as the result of substantially changed beliefs about the burden
they impose.
The tension between narrowing and widening approaches has a
rough counterpart or analogue in debates about employee drug testing and airport profiling; between those who favor ever-greater refinement in the criteria for imposing an intrusive or demeaning procedure and those who favor its universalization. In the latter cases,
the imposition of the same drug tests and security tests on everyone
largely eliminates the insult to the preponderantly innocent members of suspect groups, at the cost of small inconvenience to everyone,
great administrative burdens, and a more pervasive threat to civil
liberties; in the case of prenatal testing, the costs of “universalization” are far less tangible: the corruption of parental attachment by a
consumer mentality. As in prenatal testing, the costs of further refinement in drug testing are the greater stigmatization of those selected against by the more refined procedure, and the “penumbral”
stigmatization of those who barely pass.
In the next Section, I will offer a critique of the most fully developed narrowing proposal. In the final Sections, I will take up two
significant challenges to the alternative approach of consumer sovereignty: that it will increase, not reduce, the stigmatization of people
with disabilities, and that it cannot accommodate wrongful life or
wrongful birth actions under the rubric of medical malpractice or
autonomy violation.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR RESTRICTING PRENATAL TESTING
Jeff Botkin and Dorothy Wertz have proposed quite different narrowing approaches, with very different kinds of restrictions on prenatal testing, both designed to maintain the medical legitimacy of the
procedure.18 Botkin would permit testing only for conditions expected
to impose serious burdens on parents and families,19 while Wertz
would permit testing for any pathological condition for which the future child was at high risk, regardless of severity. Wertz’s approach
17. See Erik Parens & Adrienne Asch, The Disability Rights Critique of Prenatal Genetic Testing: Reflections and Recommendations, in PRENATAL TESTING AND DISABILITY
RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 3, 30-31.
18. Botkin, Line Drawing, supra note 16; Wertz, supra note 16.
19. Botkin, Fetal Privacy, supra note 16; Botkin, Line Drawing, supra note 16.
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has the virtue of unprincipled consistency; it would permit testing
and termination for any condition deemed pathological, however minor, from color-blindness to a missing toe.20 This permissive approach
would be rejected by most defenders of current practice. I will have
nothing further to say about it here, since I will be advocating the
even more permissive alternative of eliminating the requirement
that the condition tested for be pathological.
Botkin would drop the fiction that prenatal testing served any
medical function for future children, but he argues that it does, or
could serve, a legitimate medical function for actual parents and
families—to protect them from harm arising from the birth and upkeep of children with severe impairments.21 While a notion of “family
health” would be highly suspect, having the same pretextual quality
as “maternal anxiety” as a medical justification for abortion in general, Botkin bases his standard on family welfare, not health.22 This
commits him to a broader conception of the doctor’s professional role
than many doctors and bioethicists would be willing to accept. But
since I see no reason for restricting the doctor’s role to the protection
and promotion of health, narrowly conceived, I have no criticism of
Botkin on this ground.
I will not argue, however, that Botkin’s standard is untenable. He
claims that the line he proposes will not only arrest the slide down
the slippery slope toward “designer babies,” but mitigate the adverse
impact of prenatal testing on people with disabilities.23 I do not know
whether the implementation of his standard would reduce the adverse social and psychological impact on people with disabilities,
though I am skeptical that it would. What I will claim is that the
proposal to restrict offers of prenatal testing to conditions likely to
have a substantial impact on family welfare is ambiguous and unworkable. Because the correlation between the medical severity of
the conditions tested for and the psychological impact on families is
much weaker and less susceptible to generalization than Botkin recognizes, it is not clear how he can develop a standard of care that
would protect the welfare of families who had strong but idiosyncratic reactions to traits like female gender or webbed fingers. And to
the extent that generalizations can be made about family welfare,
they will license the offer of prenatal testing for traits such as female
gender or webbed fingers in societies where the birth of children with
those traits will be expected to have a significant impact on family
welfare.

20.
21.
22.
23.

Wertz, supra note 16, at 274-78.
Botkin, Line Drawing, supra note 16, at 300.
Botkin, Fetal Privacy, supra note 16, at 37-38.
Botkin, Line Drawing, supra note 16, at 305.
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In the final Sections, I will take up two significant challenges to
the alternative approach of consumer sovereignty: that it will increase, not reduce, the stigmatization of people with disabilities, and
that it cannot accommodate wrongful life or wrongful birth actions
under the rubric of medical malpractice or autonomy violation.
V. FETAL IMPAIRMENT AND PARENTAL WELFARE
Botkin’s “family welfare” standard is an unstable hybrid, because
there is only a tenuous link between the medical severity of the fetal
abnormality and the welfare of the family. As a medical notion, “severity” offers a workable if vague standard, at least if it is taken to
involve only an ordinal comparison: most professionals and laypeople
would rate Tay Sachs more severe than CF; CF more severe than
color-blindness. But a standard based on “the impact of the medical
condition on the family,” authorizing testing for “conditions that may
significantly impair the legitimate interests of the parents [and other
children]”24 will either yield highly objectionable results in many
cases or end up as little more than a variant of the parentalpreference standard that Botkin rejects.
In an earlier article, Botkin proposes offering tests for conditions
that would threaten harms to parents “of approximately the same
magnitude as the harms of an unwanted pregnancy.”25 His list includes diseases “often fatal in childhood,” chronic illnesses “requir[ing] repeated hospitalization,” conditions that would not allow a
child “to achieve independence in his or her adult years,” and conditions “of such severity that there are constant demands on the parents for time, effort, and financial resources.”26 As Adrienne Asch has
argued,27 these features—particularly the last two—have a much
more contingent relationship than Botkin assumes to the specific
medical conditions he cites as examples, such as Down and CF. Frequent, extended hospitalizations and life-long dependence may arise
from deficient, discriminatory, and malleable social arrangements
rather than from anything inherent in those medical conditions.
Even if we accept, for the sake of argument, that these burdens are
inherent in those conditions Botkin cites, it is not clear why these
burdens should be regarded as worse than those of many conditions

24. Id. at 300.
25. Botkin, Fetal Privacy, supra note 16, at 36. Botkin arrives at this standard by arguing that it represents the same balancing of parental and family interests with fetal privacy and confidentiality that permits general abortions through the second trimester.
Since I do not think fetuses have interests in privacy or confidentiality, I think Botkin’s
derivation of this standard is mistaken, but this is not the place to make that argument.
26. Id. at 37-38.
27. Adrienne Asch, Prenatal Diagnosis and Selective Abortion: A Challenge to Practice
and Policy, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1649, 1653 (1999).
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he would exclude, such as Huntington’s. Many parents, I suspect,
would not regard it as a greater harm to raise a child who required
frequent hospitalization or continuing support than to raise a child
with a fifty percent chance of premature death from the same degenerative condition that they or their spouse will soon die from. Although Botkin’s more recent paper talks about welfare rather than
harm,28 the problem is the same: he neither supplies an account of
harm or welfare that would draw the line where he wants it, nor offers evidence of a broad consensus on what counts as a significant
harm or threat to welfare.
A growing body of research suggests that families with severely
impaired children do not differ significantly in stresses and burdens
from families with normal children.29 These findings weaken any
presumption that family welfare will be damaged by the birth of an
impaired child. Botkin might deny that evidence of the resilience and
flourishing of families with severely impaired children would weigh
against his current proposal. He insists that his standard now
gauges family “impact,” not “burden,”30 so that only evidence of slight
magnitude, not positive valence, would count against it. But he cannot maintain this value neutrality for even a single page. Just a
paragraph above his declaration of neutrality, he asserts that “practitioners should provide information on conditions that may significantly impair the legitimate interests of the parents.”31 But talk of
conditions that “impair” rather than “affect” is hardly more neutral
than talk of “burden” rather than “impact.” Moreover, Botkin would
have practitioners assess the “severity” of impact,32 a term which is
hardly neutral. People ecstatically transformed by birth, marriage, or
other blessed events would hardly describe the impact of those
events as “severe.”
More important than Botkin’s inconsistency is the problem he
would confront if he were consistent: the birth of any child, especially
a first child, is such a transformative event that it may be difficult to
claim that the birth of a child with a severe impairment will generally have a more substantial impact. Even if that claim can be established by definitional fiat—Botkin would offer testing only for conditions that typically involved extraordinary impacts, such as frequent
hospitalization, intensive daily medical care, or life-long dependency—his proposal would also require offers of testing for genetically28. Botkin, Line Drawing, supra note 16, at 300.
29. See generally Phillip M. Ferguson et al., The Experience of Disability in Families:
A Synthesis of Research and Parent Narratives, in PRENATAL TESTING AND DISABILITY
RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 72.
30. Botkin, Line Drawing, supra note 16, at 288, 300.
31. Id. (emphasis added).
32. Id.
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detectable athletic, musical, or intellectual prodigy. As Asch points
out, the additional impact of child prodigies on their families may be
at least as great as that of children with Down or CF.33
Even if Botkin were able to support the generalizations he offers,
and the lines he expects them to yield, he would have to face the
problem of exceptions. Taking what is often regarded as a clear case,
Botkin maintains that
[p]hysicians should not be obligated to offer prenatal gender testing to all parents, even if we can find justification in isolated cases.
In general terms, the impact of a child of the unwanted gender on
the parents is not sufficiently severe to warrant offers of gender selection as the standard of care.34

It is hard to disagree with Botkin that an average American couple’s
preference for a boy, or a girl, or a “gender-balanced” family, does not
implicate their family’s welfare enough to warrant an offer of testing.
But such a couple is unlikely to want testing specifically for that
purpose. It is not clear what Botkin would propose in the case of a
couple or family for whom the birth of a child of the unwanted gender
might well have a severe impact: if, say, the prospective father or an
older sibling had a history of sexual abuse toward girls. Presumably,
Botkin would regard the doctor as obliged to offer prenatal gender
testing to such parents, if she knew of these unusual circumstances.
But she would not know unless she asked or inquired.
Perhaps Botkin would respond that the doctor was not obliged to
find out if there were circumstances that made particular fetal traits
a threat to family welfare. But this would be a striking departure
from normal medical practice. Doctors are obliged, for example, to
ask if patients have (relatively rare) allergic response to common antibiotics. If, on the other hand, a doctor would be obliged to ask or inquire about circumstances that made even common fetal traits like
female gender risky to family welfare, then it is not clear what role
Botkin’s “standard of care” would be left to play. The comparison to
allergies suggests that the need for inquiry would be, if anything,
greater in the case of prenatal testing, because threats to family welfare are harder to assess than reactions to antibiotics. If the doctor is
protecting the parents’ welfare rather than simply fulfilling their
wishes, she must assess whether the birth of a child with a particular trait would in fact have (or be likely to have) a substantial impact
on the family’s welfare. She cannot make that assessment simply by
asking the parents—they often do not know, and are likely to be
wrong.

33. Asch, supra note 27, at 1653-56.
34. Botkin, Line Drawing, supra note 16, at 301.
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The point is not that physicians should decline to raise the prospect of testing, but that families’ actual responses to children with a
variety of normal and abnormal traits are sufficiently varied to call
almost any generalization into question. Botkin’s “standard of care”
would require an inquiry into family strengths and vulnerabilities
that would precede or accompany any offer of testing. But such an
inquiry would eliminate the justification for a standard offer, or a
routine multiplex test, because the doctor should offer whatever tests
her inquiry indicates are warranted. Even if those tests in many
cases were the very ones that would be on Botkin’s standard list,
they would not enjoy the privileged status that his proposal confers
on them.
There is a further problem with Botkin’s standard as it applies to
social and cultural settings where his seemingly uncontroversial
generalizations wouldn’t hold. It simply may be false in India, or in a
number of Muslim countries, that “[i]n general terms, the impact of a
child of the unwanted gender on the parents is not sufficiently severe
to warrant offers of gender selection as the standard of care.”35 The
birth of a girl, or another girl, may mean impoverishment or stigmatization for the family. In other societies, the birth of a child with
mild but visible deformities such as webbed fingers may have a similar impact on the family. Perhaps Botkin would contend that the
parents would not have a “legitimate interest” in avoiding such consequences, even if they were innocent of the underlying prejudices.
But it seems unreasonably harsh or demanding to claim that parents
have no legitimate interest in avoiding poverty or ostracism based on
the prejudices of the society in which they happen to live. Surely
there is a case to be made at the policy level in these countries for
limiting gender- and disability-testing, but doctors serving the welfare of their individual patients are hardly the appropriate instruments for that policy. Much like Erik Nord’s proposal to elicit social
values as a basis for distributing scarce health-care resources,36 Botkin’s standard appears defenseless against profoundly inegalitarian
social values.
VI. IS UNRESTRICTED TESTING A BETTER ALTERNATIVE?
As I suggested earlier, I am willing to assume, for the sake of argument, a claim of Botkin’s that many disability critics reject: that
line-drawing on the basis of parental or family welfare would reduce
rather than exacerbate the adverse social and psychological effects of
prenatal testing and selective abortion on existing people with disabilities. My argument has been that his proposal is unworkable as
35. Id.
36. See ERIK NORD, COST-VALUE ANALYSIS IN HEALTH CARE (1999).

2003]

A CHOICE OF EVILS

307

the basis for a standard of care; that it will either yield a morally
problematic failure to offer testing to families whose welfare is likely
to be substantially affected by the birth of a child with certain “normal” traits or medically minor impairments, or else will undermine
the justification for a standard offer, and instead require complex,
individualized inquiries into family welfare.
The comparative virtue of the alternative approach—of offering
any and all available testing—is that it would give no official or privileged role to impairments in the determination of whether to offer
testing or abortion. I do not know whether such a regime would provide social and psychological benefit to existing people with disabilities. Botkin argues forcefully that it would not:
[I]t hardly seems beneficial to the welfare of the disabled community to advocate that all conditions be subject to prenatal diagnosis
and selective termination. This would appear to be the fast lane to
“perfectibilism” and intolerance for progressively less severe disabilities. If society condones and promotes prenatal diagnosis for
the full spectrum of medical (and nonmedical) conditions, what
message does that send? If we want to promote inclusiveness, understanding, and support for those with disabilities, requiring the
extensive provision of prenatal diagnostic information and services
would appear to be a poor strategy. My concern is that the attempt
to eliminate the hurtful effects of line drawing in prenatal diagnosis will fuel a broader set of discriminatory attitudes in society
that will be much more hurtful to those with disabilities in the
long run.37

Forceful as this passage is, it conflates two distinct concerns: the social and psychological impact of a prenatal testing regime on people
with disabilities, and the “kind of message it sends”—its expressive
significance. I have argued that the stigmatization of impairments
and the craving for perfection should not be seen as falling on some
continuum of intolerance, but rather are quite distinct, at least in
theory. There is no logical reason, and no psychological evidence I
know of, that people who strive for perfection in themselves or their
children are comparatively less tolerant of impairments than of imperfections or limitations that fall within the normal range for human beings. A relentless perfectionist can, quite consistently, be a
universalist about impairment, finding all of us “impaired” when
measured against his impossible ideal. A perfectionist may tend to
minimize the differences between imperfections which are medically
abnormal and normal.
I concede that I may be wrong about the psychology and social
impact of perfectionism. Perhaps an unrestricted prenatal-testing re37. Botkin, Line Drawing, supra note 16, at 305.
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gime would in fact increase the stigmatization of impairments and
discrimination against the people who bear them. Or perhaps it
would make little or no difference, because most prospective parents
would end up testing only for medically severe impairments in any
case, in part because they shared in the stigmatization of those impairments, in part because those conditions were more readily tested
for—not only because they have more detectable genetic links, but
because the scientific development of prenatal tests reflects the popular stigmatization of the conditions tested for.
But this is not all that matters in gauging the expressive significance of a prenatal-testing regime. A testing policy that gave no special status to medical impairments, that did not treat them as providing even a presumptively stronger basis for termination than any
other human trait or variation, would emphatically reject the exceptionalism about impairment that has dominated prenatal testing
since its inception. It would “send the message,” to use Botkin’s
phrase, that the prospect of impairment did not give parents a privileged or especially strong reason to abort; that impairments were
just some among the indefinite number of variations that might be
relevant to the decisions of prospective parents about whether to
bring a child into the world.
VII. DUTY AND BREACH: THE DUTY TO INFORM AND THE FUTURE OF
WRONGFUL BIRTH CLAIMS IN AN UNRESTRICTED
PRENATAL TESTING REGIME
There is considerable uncertainty about the scope of the doctor’s
duties to inform and test under an unrestricted testing regime.38
While this is not the place, and I am not the person, to suggest a protocol for assessing the preferences of prospective parents, several features seem clear. First, it would not require what Botkin calls “full
disclosure”39—the breathless recitation of every conceivable condition
for which testing may be available. While some parents may want
such disclosure, most will want far less, and some, none at all. The
doctor should begin by asking the couple whether they want testing
at all, or would rather take whatever nature yields. In the stilldistant future when prenatal therapy is available, this may no longer
38. Julian Savulescu proposes a similar testing regime, in which “doctors are expected
to disclose those facts which each individual patient would find relevant to her decision
making” and in which any test she deemed relevant would be available “consistent with
the fair allocation of limited health resources.” Julian Savulescu, Editorial, Is There a
Right Not to be Born? Reproductive Decision Making, Options, and the Right to Information, 28 J. MED. ETHICS 65, 66 (2002). Savulescu favors parental autonomy because he believes that parents are the best judges of their own, and their children’s, well-being, and
that we should aim to maximize well-being—a very different rationale than one based on
respect for the dignity and equality of people with disabilities.
39. Botkin, Fetal Privacy, supra note 16, at 34.
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be an appropriate lead question, for the doctor may not be able to
conscientiously take “no” for an answer. But for now, a blanket refusal to be tested should be conclusive, no matter how great the
probability of a genetic abnormality, except perhaps in cases where
the doctor has reason to suspect a substantial probability of a genetic
or chromosomal condition that would, arguably, make the child’s life
not worth living, his very birth a harm, for example, Tay Sachs,
Lesch-Nyhans, Trisomies 13 or 18. (Of course, many couples would
want to know why the doctor is asking, making the Gricean assumption that there must be some heightened risk to trigger the inquiry.)
The doctor might present an overview of the range of normal and abnormal phenotypes, from female gender to Tay Sachs, perhaps with
accompanying frequencies for sample conditions. It would then be up
to the couple (or woman—but I will assume for simplicity’s sake that
the doctor is addressing a couple) to decide whether they wanted to
know more about particular conditions, or about the probabilities for
those conditions, given their ages and family histories. And it would
then be up to the couple to decide what tests, if any, to obtain. Some
minimum probability for the tested condition might be required—but
not a minimum varying with “severity” in any sense of that term.
The obvious question of who would pay could be addressed either
by offering different health-insurance policies, with higher premiums
for fuller coverage, or by adopting the usual co-pay mechanism. The
former might be unreasonably difficult, since couples would have to
decide on testing coverage well before they decided whether to have
children. The latter might be fairer, and consistent with a general
destigmatization policy if the charges for tests were based on their
actual cost, not on some professional judgment of their medical appropriateness or urgency. Admittedly, those costs, as well as the very
existence of the tests, might reflect professional judgments about priorities in genetic research and development. But the very fact that it
was not the doctor, hospital, or insurer who was making those judgments would mute their expressive significance.
Under such a consumer-sovereignty/parental autonomy regime,
standards for reasonable competence and adequacy in informing,
testing, and reporting would evolve in practice, perhaps guided by
model protocols or scripts by professional associations. The breach of
a doctor’s duty to inform or perform with reasonable competence
would be regarded as infringing the parents’ procreative autonomy.
Claims for damages and offsets would be treated similarly for
healthy and disabled children, since all are rewarding, expensive,
and challenging, to varying degrees.40 An autonomy-based approach
40. The question would arise about whether one can suffer a loss of autonomy in being denied or misled about information that may be of dubious or exaggerated relevance—
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would clearly favor uniform damages, punitive more than compensatory, reflecting the slight to the parents’ freedom and dignity rather
than the impact on their budget or their emotions.
VIII. THE DEATH OF WRONGFUL LIFE CLAIMS?
The expressive significance of a refusal to limit wrongful birth
suits to cases of impairment would be muted or lost if children were
allowed to sue for wrongful life only on the basis of their impairments. One alternative would be to deny wrongful life suits altogether, or to limit them to conditions so severe that they arguably
rendered life not worth living—including Tay Sachs, Lesch Nyhans,
Trisomies 13 and 18, but little else.41 The other alternative, which I
want to conclude by exploring, would be to extend the approach I
have suggested for wrongful birth claims to wrongful life claims, so
that they were not limited to impairment, but covered any significant
and foreseeable harm the child suffered.
According to a line of argument that has enjoyed some recent currency, it is presumptively wrong to bring any child into the world, not
just a severely disabled child. This argument rests on a claimed
asymmetry between non-creation and creation: while it is not bad to
fail to confer the goods of life, it is good to avoid the bads of life. Thus,
the argument goes, because there is no bad in never existing, while
there is good in avoiding the harms of existence, the good of existence
is balanced or offset by the good of non-existence, so that the inevitable harms and sorrows of living make existence a net bad, and make
creation a presumptive wrong.42
I think this argument is profoundly mistaken. But it suggests an
approach to wrongful life cases that does not treat the birth of a disabled child any differently in principle than the birth of a normal
child. Those intentionally or negligently responsible for creating any
child are presumptively responsible for the harms it suffers. In the
case of parents, the care, nurturing, and material support they give

does autonomy involve acting on right reasons or merely reasons of one’s own choosing?
For example, what if a doctor negligently misreports fetal sex to a couple who had requested that information and who would have aborted a female fetus merely to achieve
gender-balance? The testing regime I am sketching would be committed to the latter conception of autonomy, and would have to respond similarly to all failures to disclose information deemed relevant by the prospective parents.
41. Few jurisdictions in fact recognize wrongful life claims for any conditions. A useful
review of legal and policy issues in wrongful birth and wrongful life actions can be found in
Jeffrey R. Botkin, Reproduction, Law, Wrongful Birth, and Wrongful Life Actions, in 2
ENCYLOPEDIA OF ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLICY ISSUES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 996 (Thomas H.
Murray & Maxwell J. Mehlman eds., 2000).
42. For variations on this argument, see David Benatar, Why it is Better Never to
Come into Existence, 34 AM. PHIL. Q. 345 (1997); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Wrongful Life,
Procreative Responsibility, and the Significance of Harm, 5 LEGAL THEORY 117 (1999).
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their children would generally discharge any obligations arising from
the infliction of these harms. In the case of third-parties like doctors,
any responsibility/liability they have is superceded or nullified by
their duty to the parents to provide assistance in bringing the child
into existence. But when they breach their duty to the parents, either
by failing to prevent pregnancy or by failing to disclose risk factors
that would lead the parents to test and terminate, they are liable for
the harms of the child’s existence. As a practical matter, they become
liable for the costs of raising the child and covering his medical expenses, costs that will obviously be greater with some impairments
but will be considerable even for a normal child conceived through
the doctor’s negligence.
Many people would recoil at the idea that parents’ duties to their
children have a corrective or compensatory character—to redress the
wrong doing by bringing them into existence. More broadly, this approach appears to involve much the same kind of suspect moral accounting as negative utilitarianism: only (non-comparative) bads are
counted, with no offset for goods. (The actual accounting is not quite
the same, because negative utilitarians look only at bads, while those
who treat life-creation as a presumptive wrong either: (1) treat the
good of existence as balanced or cancelled by the good of avoiding the
bads of existence,43 or (2) contend that only the avoidance of bad, and
not the attainment of good, can justify potentially harmful interventions without consent.)44
A more modest approach may be available to impose liability for
the foreseeable harms suffered by a child, impaired or not, who
would not be alive but for professional negligence. On a more plausible accounting, we count goods and bads, but only if they can be attributed to the agent. With this approach, the asymmetry is in the
attribution: the bads in a child’s life may be more readily attributable
to the agent than the goods in that life.45 But why shouldn’t a doctor
whose negligent diagnosis averts an abortion that would otherwise
have occurred get credit for the good as well as the bad of the impaired life that results? It is only in a “same number” case46—where
the parents are committed to a fixed number of children—that the
doctor could be said to be responsible in a but-for sense only for the
bad, since the parents would have gone on to have a normal child had
they aborted this time around. And making the doctor liable only in
same-number cases would be highly problematic. The problem is not
only epistemic; in knowing what in fact counts as a same number

43.
44.
45.
46.

Benatar, supra note 42.
Shiffrin, supra note 42.
See Matthew Hanser, Harming Future People, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47 (1990).
The term comes from DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS (1984).
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case; it is conceptual, in determining what the criteria for such cases
are. The problem is also moral, because the two most plausible criteria for distinguishing same (and different) number cases both place
the doctor’s liability beyond his control—parental intentions with respect to the number of children they will have under different circumstances, which the doctor will not, and perhaps could or should
not know; or the actual number of people who will ever exist in the
world, an utterly contingent matter which no one can assess at the
present time.
It is necessary to argue that there may be different states of mind
required, or different causal connections, for the attribution of benefits and burdens, or even for particular benefits and burdens. Thus, it
could be argued that only an individual with procreative intentions
or “parental attachment”47 can claim credit for the good of, and goods
in, a child’s existence, states of mind that a negligent physician will
rarely possess. Or it could be argued that the adaptive processes that
make life not only worthwhile, but incommensurably good for people
with various disabilities, or that transform the attitudes of their parents from dread and despair to joy and enthusiasm, are, in effect, superceding causes, that block any attribution to the physician or other
third parties for the benefits arising from those transformations.
This approach would justify both of the lawsuits arising from J.
Bopp’s hypothetical traffic accident:48 the negligent ob/gyn is responsible for the woman’s grief and burden, or at least the additional
medical costs of raising an impaired child; the reckless driver is responsible for the traumatic loss of consortium between mother and
child. The doctor receives no credit or offset for the transformation in
the mother’s attitude that brought her joy and made her subsequent
loss so traumatic; the driver receives no credit or offset for relieving
the mother of her pre-transformation burden. The wrongful-life analogue would be a severely impaired child suing a negligent doctor for
medical expenses while suing a third-party for attempted murder.
The doctor would get no credit or offset in the adaptation that made
the child’s life so valuable to him, and that arguably aggravated the
harm threatened by his post-natal assailant; the assailant would get
no credit or offset for attempting to remove his pre-adaptation burden.

47. See Lois Shepherd, Protecting Parents’ Freedom to Have Children with Genetic
Differences, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 761.
48. James Bopp, Jr. et al., The “Rights” and “Wrongs” of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful
Life: A Jurisprudential Analysis of Birth Related Torts, 27 DUQ. L. REV. 461 (1989).
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CONCLUSION
I have argued, often in a somewhat oblique way, for the comparative virtues of an unrestricted regime of prenatal testing over a regime restricted by a criterion of “severity”—the severity of either the
medical condition of the fetus, or the impact on the family. My primary argument has been a moral, not an empirical one—that an unrestricted regime will avoid or mute the expressive significance of
prenatal selection for impairment: the “message” that the prospect of
severe impairment provides a categorically better reason for refusing
to bring a child into the world than the indefinite number of other
potentially burdensome traits and conditions that a child may have.
A testing regime that limited prenatal testing to severe impairments
would obviously send that message, while a regime that limited such
testing to conditions likely to have a severe impact on family welfare
would either have similar expressive significance, in its reliance on
presumptions about the impact of severe impairments, or else require a complex, individualized inquiry into family welfare that
would render it impracticable.
I have conceded both that an unrestricted testing regime might
not reduce the adverse social and psychological impact of prenatal
testing on people with impairments, and that it might promote a noxious consumerism or perfectionism about the creation of children.
Perhaps I underestimate the risks I concede, but my preference for
incurring them has a moral basis as well—I think the further stigmatization of impairments, which an unrestricted regime would be
directed against, would be a greater evil than the further commodification of children. But this moral conviction may rest in part on an
empirical conviction, and perhaps a naive one—that the tendency to
stigmatize physical and mental differences is deeply engrained and
recalcitrant, whereas the tendency to treat children as commodities
will be largely offset by the transformative effect of actually raising
them.

